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ABSTRACT
What does time mean in conservation? Is time 
present in conservation as an implicit or explicit 
dimension, and how does conservation, if at 
all, conceptualize time? By proposing a tempo-
ral critique of conservation, this paper argues 
that thinking time has been absent from the 
narratives of conservation, its episteme, theo-
retical and research-generating activities, and 
from its practical theoretical engagement with 
the material world. Reviewing varying implicit 
manifestations of time in conservation, it subse-
quently proposes an alternative way of thinking 
about time.
Time and conservation
OVERTURE
The formulation “Linking Past and Future” has temporal undertones (and 
is a thematic concern of a conference on the occasion of which this paper 
emerged). It implies a certain understanding of time, while, simultaneously, 
it carries a promise for a better, brighter, and more conscious future. Linking 
past and future elicits the rhetoric of conservation that asserts its ability 
to enter the past by manipulating the objects’ condition in the present. 
Oftentimes, this activity is underpinned by the belief that the past is within 
a reach and that it can be resurrected. Whether this assumption remains 
true or false, what interests me in this context is whether, and to what 
degree, such activity evokes a contestation with time, and why, for that 
matter, the notion of time has never been scrutinized in conservation. Is it 
possible that conservation implicitly manipulates time without explicating 
the time’s intrinsic complexities? What does it mean that conservation is 
preoccupied with the past? And, what kind of time governs conservation?
THINKING TIME IN CONSERVATION
In what follows, I argue that the concept of time lies at the grounds of 
the conservation’s practical and philosophical project. My paper pursues 
a purely theoretical approach; it is based on my readings of conservation 
theoretical texts, observation, and practical experience gathered through 
long-time engagement with changeable artworks, both traditional and recent. 
I have chosen a theoretical approach in the belief that there is a need for 
a meaningful theorization of conservation. Thinking time in conservation 
is necessary as it strives to advance conservation’s critical theoretical 
discourse. My use of the gerund “thinking” instead of “rethinking,” is 
deliberate: The latter would suggest that time in conservation has already 
been scrutinized. Fostering an interdisciplinary approach (combining the 
theory of conservation, heritage studies and philosophy), I suggest that 
time has come to revisit the temporal dimension of conservation in order 
for it to acquire a certain temporal consciousness.
WHAT’S (THE) TIME?
“What then is time? If no one asks of me, I know; if I wish to explain 
to him who asks, I know not” contends Saint Augustine in Confessions, 
written in the 4th century (Book IX, emphasis mine). To be sure, time is 
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one of the most mysterious aspects of the world we live in. Even today, 
there is no universal definition of time. “In a sense, it is always too late 
to talk about time”, posited French philosopher Jacques Derrida in 1972 
(Derrida 1972, 42). In turn, after having acquired a vast number of books 
devoted to the topic of time, the Korean video artist Nam June Paik realized 
that he had absolutely no time to read them.
Too often, we find ourselves facing the unsolved and ubiquitous paradigm 
of time, the measured time of clocks and media, and subjective time that 
does not comply with its measurability. Time occurs within a range of 
various intensities and velocities while reading an interesting book or 
watching a play; it may turn into a painful expectation when we wait 
for something that we long for, an important message or a delayed train.
TIME AS MEASUREMENT
In the Western world, the common sense definition of time as a method of 
its measurement was initiated at the end of the 13th century by mechanical 
clocks. This moment also marks the inception of modern homogenous 
time, which replaced traditional methods of time measurement based on 
unequal intervals calculated by the length of daylight. Clock time was 
applied in monastic life. The monastery’s towers became houses for clocks; 
they not only announced hours and religious festivities but also marked 
the beginning and end of the working day. French philosopher Michel 
Foucault saw in the religious orders the establishment of discipline and 
a chronological way of thinking linked with the application of timetable 
(Foucault 1995, 150). The beginning of time’s secular life is marked by 
the moment when clocks began to announce the hours from the town hall’s 
towers to regulate work of Flanders and Northern France textile towns 
(Mooij 2005, 105). But it was the modern science that confirmed time’s 
tightness to irreversible direction, reaching its prominent stage with the 
refinement of the theory of entropy, the second law of thermodynamics. 
Further, scholars consider railway and telegraph as media that helped to 
regulate and standardize time. The rise of capitalism and the expanding 
economy tied the attachment of humans to clock time and manifested in the 
control over the cycles of their labor and leisure (conceptualized by Karl 
Marx). According to the media theorist Bliss Cua Lim, this modern time 
consciousness became gradually natural and incontrovertible, obscuring 
the plurality of human existence in time (Cua Lim 2009, 11). We accepted 
it as a ready-made temporality.
THE READY-MADE TIME OF CONSERVATION
Conservation, I argue, adapted the sequential, chronological time that 
results in the understanding of time merely as a method of its measurement 
– the time of clocks, machines, scientific apparatus, historic chronologies, 
industry, and labor. While critical theory, philosophy and art practice have 
long been engaged with anachronistic and heterochronic interpretations of 
historical time – the belated and the put-of-synch, seriality and repetition, 
to name but a few – conservation, so it seems, has overtaken the ready-
made temporality expressed in linear structures – the inheritance of the 
clock-time discipline of capitalist modernity.
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In conservation, however, time exists as a merely implied dimension. 
It manifests itself, among other things, in the way conservators adapt 
thinking about events that take place in the life of artworks as occurring on 
a timeline, valuing them according to their precedence. This valuation is 
revealed in the wish to access the point of creation, the author’s intention 
and the sources of the original object. The paradigms of conservation 
such as the concepts of reversibility, the belief in an original/preferred 
condition of an artwork, and the notion of restoration rest on the implied 
notion of measurable and linear time. I will now gradually unpack these 
concepts.
As a rule, “original state” concerns the material condition of an artwork 
and corresponds to the idea of an artwork’s history being restricted 
to its physical history (Villers 2003, 5). At times, however, the idea 
of an “original state” can also be applied to a work’s “concept,” as 
when the “purpose of restoration” becomes “the conservation of an 
object so that it can be seen, or even used, in its original concept and 
original beauty” (Ashley Smith 2004, 19). It is widely accepted that, 
when a museum purchases a piece of installation art, for instance, the 
artwork becomes “frozen” in that particular historical moment at which 
it enters the collection. The traditional understanding of an artwork being 
“locked in time” is expressed by the term freeze strategies; similarly, the 
formulation freeze-frame paradigm referred to the conservation of an 
artwork based on scientific analysis that excluded truths derived from 
phenomenological awareness and interpretation.1
The ideal of restoring a work to a past condition was closely associated 
with the notion of the state of an artwork as the artist intended it. This 
was largely due, as Steven Dykstra put it, to scientific techniques 
introduced to the conservation laboratory in the 19th century that made 
it possible to analyze materials and thereby to discern between the 
materials originally used by the artist and those added later.2 There is a 
close relationship between the “intended” instance of a work and what 
has been referred to as the “authentic condition” (as a rule, a material 
condition). In traditional conservation the term “authentic condition” 
is associated with a sequential understanding of time: in the life of an 
artwork, events that occur earlier on the timeline appear to have a higher 
authentic value than those that occur later. Thus, the “authentic” is often 
tied to an early state of the work, while the “original” lies proximate to 
the origins of an artwork or its conception. Similar ideas are expressed 
in the argument that the goal of conservation should be to capture not 
the “original” of a work but its “ideal state” – a state “defined by time, 
not by physical description” (Appelbaum 2009, 176–7). To determine an 
object’s ideal state, we first need to fix it to a specific historical moment 
and then determine the physical state that corresponds to that moment. 
The “return” to the past inherent in the ideal state confirms once again 
conservation’s deep-rooted belief in sequentiality and a recoverable past.
The concept of reversibility – a much-contested theory related to the 
paradigm of minimal intervention – reveals an implied obedience to 
sequential, linear time and, at the same time, attempts to question it. 
It does this by positing a state to which an object can return if the 
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materials and processes employed by conservators are reversible. This also 
approximates the idea of re-storation, which, from an etymological point 
of view, already involves the notion of “redoing.”3 The impossibility of 
such a return in traditional and multimedia artworks reveals the paradox 
here. The concept of reversibility violates the principles of decay and 
aging (nothing can ever become younger) and exposes the lack of an 
appropriate conception of time.
The understanding of temporal progression that follows a sequential 
timeline leads to peculiar situations: in order to satisfy the patterns of 
chronology, changeable artworks that are characterized by multiple 
materializations such as multimedia installations, performances, (Fluxus) 
events, and conceptual artworks (conceived as a concept and conveyed 
in an instruction) would have to be reduced to a preferred, singular 
state.4 It goes without saying that to reduce a changeable work which 
manifests itself in different spatio-temporal constellations runs the 
risk of impoverishing its potential. Unlike traditional media, which 
are conceived as unique works in a singular medium, it is precisely the 
ability to change and transform that allows these artworks to survive 
and to be transmitted into the future.
But do traditional artworks, such as painting or sculpture, not evolve 
and change over time, only slower, rather than fast?5 And are they not 
inhibited in a singular, preferred condition?
THE NOTION OF DURATION
As a supplement to the concept of entropy (second law of thermodynamics) 
and temporal irreversibility (decay), I propose to consider an alternate 
conception of time in conservation. This concept aligns with artworks 
being human cultural creation, rather that the product of measurement, 
analysis and chronological orders. Here, the temporal analysis by French 
philosopher Henri Bergson has profound implications for the resolution 
of conservation’s engagement with time.
The philosophical project of Henri Bergson (1859–1941) posits that time 
does not exist as a linear entity marked by a succession of separate points 
in the past, present, and on into the future – a view of time that follows 
Aristotelian notion of time as a line and merely coincides with the trajectory 
of a clock hand.6 Bergson believed that the reduction of time to space and 
numbers is caused by science’s capacity to measure points on a line and 
simultaneities as starting and end points of movement. (This reduction 
reverberates the conservation scientific approach to measure materials 
and determine their properties in the search for the essence of the work.) 
For Bergson, time is neither theological, nor cyclical (time cultivated by 
agrarian societies). Rejecting a homogenous, conventional, spatialized, 
numerical conception of time, Bergson argued that we become acquainted 
with heterogeneous time, or durée, meaning duration. Durée, the movement 
of time itself, the permanent, unstoppable changing of things, is first of 
all a critique of the time of the natural sciences conceived on the basis of 
space: fragmented time. Instead, durée is based on the idea of a present 
involving a past and an anticipation of a future. And I propose to apply 
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Figure 1. Diagram drawn by the author 
after Bergson’s cone of memory. The diagram 
illustrates the coexistence of varying 
temporalities in the present
this idea to the understanding of time in conservation and to artworks as 
entities enduring in time, subject to a continuous, indivisible flux of change.
In his book Bergsonism (1966), French philosopher Gilles Deleuze provides 
us with a comprehensive insight into Bergsonian’s method. Deleuze’s 
analysis of Bergson’s includes a visualization of the contemporaneity of 
the past in the form of a cone (Deleuze 1991[1966], 59–60) (Figure 1). The 
cone is divided into three sections – AB, A’B’, and A’’B’’ – symbolizing the 
coexistence of all layers of the past with the present. The past AB coexists 
with the present S, including sections A’B’ and A’’B’’. The sections are 
virtual, symbolically representing the distance of the past from the present, 
yet including the entirety of the past rather than its particular elements. 
The identity of duration is presented as an ever-growing image of the past 
in the present and “the conservation and preservation of the past and the 
present.” Every successive moment contracts and is condensed with the 
former and, simultaneously, “always contains, over and above the preceding 
one, the memory the latter has left it” (Deleuze 1991[1966], 51).
So in their contemporaneity, the past and the present that has been coexist, 
but the past also preserves itself endlessly within itself, while the present 
passes. Bergson argues that the past, in its entirety, is prolonged to its present 
and acts in it. Duration is the survival of the past, an ever-accumulating 
ontological memory that is wholly, automatically, and ceaselessly preserved. 
In duration, the current moment does not depose that which came before. 
Could an artwork’s present preserve all its pasts? And could conservation 
cease to depose of the moments which came after the imagined, original 
moment of creation?
Following the Bergsonian conception of time and its Deleuzian interpretation, 
I propose, first of all, that in artworks the present is the survival of the 
past. Rather than being virtual, the past is actualized in the present, which 
is all we are able to analyze from our inhabited temporal perspective. 
Duration is crucial for understanding the continuity of artworks and essential 
to divorcing conservation from its traditional views of time. Instead of 
positing a return to the past as the most justifiable goal of conservation, 
the Bergsonian concept of duration offers us a profound way to reexamine 
the assumptions of the profession. One possible consequence of applying 
durée to works characterized by change is that their changeability can 
exist unrestrictedly in a continuum of duration; in other words, each 
instantiation of a changeable artwork is equally important and preserves, 
to some extent, previous versions.
To explain how artworks experiencing change can be understood as existing 
in a continuum of previous and future manifestations, we briefly need 
to change our focus from the ontology of time to phenomenology, the 
philosophy of consciousness as dependent on subject. The continuum of 
duration encompasses what might be defined as retentions and protentions. 
The idea of retention and protention is based on Husserl’s phenomenology 
of temporality, in which he neglects the experience of the world as a 
series of unconnected instances. The protention is distinct from immediate 
experience but still retained in our consciousness; it relates to the perception 
of the moment that has yet to be perceived. The continuity rests upon 
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the idea that each moment of protention becomes a retention of the next. 
Retentions and protentions may illustrate the factual existence of an 
artwork’s instantiations, stages in its life or “conditions.” Retentions 
and protentions create a conceptual realm of duration where the past is 
becoming present (or where, returning to the Bergsonian idea, the past is 
actualized in the present). Protentions might be conceived of as an openness 
of the artwork to its future change. Because there is never a disjunction 
between protention and retention, from an ontological perspective, the 
past is preserved automatically.
CONCLUSION
In brief, the orientation of conservation toward the past involves back-and-
forth movements between abstract times, or, at best, a misinterpretation 
of linearity – in the common sense, conservators “take care of the past” 
and “pass it over to the future.” If the past is contemporaneous with the 
present, then we do not need to “preserve the past” in the traditional 
meaning of the word, but rather preserve the present. In fact, the present 
is the only given reality and the only reality to be preserved. Conservation 
could thus be defined as a process that shapes changeable artworks. 
Conservation can reduce undesirable change, but never prevent it. So, 
in my thinking, and following Bergsonian durée, artworks – as objects 
that undergo transformation – abide in their present which is constituted 
by their many different pasts. In other words, they are constructed by 
their “present” as much as by their “past conditions.”7 This not only 
results in the abandonment of the search for authenticity somewhere in 
the remote past, but also moves conservation away from its attempt to 
manage change (measured in an artwork’s former conditions) and toward 
a process intervening in the artwork’s temporality. Additionally, such a 
stance unquestionably releases conservation from the drive to “recover 
the past” or “the original” or to “give back the authentic object,” which, 
in my view, are approaches based on a misconception of time.
Whether engaged with traditional art or multimedia works, conservation 
can no longer claim to be neutral. Each intervention is a process that 
transforms the work of art. According to Cesare Brandi, conservation is 
a methodological recognition, the moment when the consciousness of 
the observer recognizes an object as a work of art (Brandi 2005, 48).8 In 
discussing the significance of the past, David Lowenthal holds that every 
act of recognition alters what survives (Lowenthal 2003, 390). This is a 
positive gesture because, as he claims, the past can be used fruitfully when 
it is “domesticated . . . to inherit is to transform” (Lowenthal 2003, 412).
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NOTES
1 For ‘freeze strategies’ see Hummelen et al. (2008, 1041–47). The freeze-frame paradigm 
was used in the context of Dutch conservation projects, such as New Strategies in the 
Conservation of Contemporary Art (2009–13).
2 In literary and philosophical circles, intentionalism was opposed by the anti-intentionalists 
resulting, among others, from the term coined as “intentional fallacy” and an eponymous 
publication by Wimsatt and M. Beardsley. See also Dykstra (1996).
3 “Re-”: word-forming element, c. 1200, from Old French and directly from Latin re- “again, 
back, against.” In Online Etymology Dictionary. http://etymonline.com/index.php?term=re-
&allowed_in_frame=0 (accessed 12 October 2016).
4 I elaborated on the notion of changeable artworks, which I relate to the concept of the 
archive and temporal materiality in Hölling (2017).
5 For artworks’ slower and faster response to time, as well as their active and passive 
engagement with time, see Hölling (2017, 120–22).
6 Bergson laid out his ideas, to which I refer throughout the text, in the following books: 
Matter and memory (1896), Time and free will (1889) and Creative evolution (1907) 
(see References).
7 Not yet advancing the concept of time but arguing from within the conceptual framework 
of authenticity, Salvador Muñoz-Viñas posits the only “authentic condition” that we 
know is the condition in which the artwork currently is (Muñoz-Viñas 2005, 94).
8 Brandi uses “restoration” in his Theoria (see Brandi 2005), where I use “conservation.”
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